This research compares the impact of cooptation and threat strategies on "revolutionary" action by a subordinate against a group leader. The major purpose is to determine conditions under which a cooptation strategy prevents subordinate revolts more effectively than threats. With a cooptation strategy, the group leader offers a promotion in exchange for compliance; with a threat strategy, the leader threatens to demote the subordinate if he/she attempts to mobilize an insurgent coalition with other subordinates. These strategies are examined in an experimental laboratory setting where a group leader sets unfair pay-rates and uses one of these strategies to prevent a subordinate revolt. Within this context, the subordinate who is the target of the leader's strategy has the option of attempting or opposing coalitions with other subordinates. The major hypotheses are conerned with subjective-expected-utility, reciprocity, and the target's vulnerability to influence from other subordinates. Subjective-expected-utility theory suggests that the impact of both strategies will depend on the magnitude of outcomes (gained or lost), weighted by the probability; and reciprocity theory suggests that cooptation will be more effective than a threat under certain conditions. In addition, the status implications of the two stratagies suggest that the target-subordinate will be more vulnerable to influence from other subordinates (nontargets) in the case of a threat. Overall, this research should provide a better understanding of the circumstances under which leaders can use rewards, rather than coercion, to reduce revolts.